Abstract-Over the past several years, there has been a growing interest within the United States defense department for something called responsive space. This movement is a reaction to a number of factors, the two most significant are: increasingly capable and miniaturized technologies and warfighter's needs for new capabilities in a network centric, system-of-systems age. Through the last 50 years of the military development of space systems, a spiral of increasing redundancy, capability and mission duration coupled with growing costs and schedules has made space increasingly unresponsive. Responsive space hopes to break out of this paradigm with agile and more capable small spacecraft employment. By lowering the cost and correspondingly shortening the timeliness, new niches for space-based systems will open up. These capabilities could be the "pointy end of the spear" with force applications deployed globally through Common Aero Vehicles (CAV) on ready low cost launchers. Or they could they could be used to support intelligence, like a responsively launched and operated Hyper Spectral Imaginary (HSI) payload flying on a common bus that was pulled out of storage and plugged into a payload through common interfaces. These responsive systems do not seek to replace traditional DoD space missions, but merely to augment the national strength with a new subset of capabilities. This will provide the joint war fighters and the national decision makers with new tools.
Abstract-Over the past several years, there has been a growing interest within the United States defense department for something called responsive space. This movement is a reaction to a number of factors, the two most significant are: increasingly capable and miniaturized technologies and warfighter's needs for new capabilities in a network centric, system-of-systems age. Through the last 50 years of the military development of space systems, a spiral of increasing redundancy, capability and mission duration coupled with growing costs and schedules has made space increasingly unresponsive. Responsive space hopes to break out of this paradigm with agile and more capable small spacecraft employment. By lowering the cost and correspondingly shortening the timeliness, new niches for space-based systems will open up. These capabilities could be the "pointy end of the spear" with force applications deployed globally through Common Aero Vehicles (CAV) on ready low cost launchers. Or they could they could be used to support intelligence, like a responsively launched and operated Hyper Spectral Imaginary (HSI) payload flying on a common bus that was pulled out of storage and plugged into a payload through common interfaces. These responsive systems do not seek to replace traditional DoD space missions, but merely to augment the national strength with a new subset of capabilities. This will provide the joint war fighters and the national decision makers with new tools. Not every mission will be responsive, such as GPS and missile warning, which are needed in their current static peacetime configuration, but if responsive space is successful in some of its niches, many other systems could benefit from a responsive component of their architecture to supply capability on demand.-Within the myriad of responsive space efforts underway, one of the drivers that has often been overlooked is the importance of the commercial market. Specifically, how important it is for driving costs down to make responsive space capabilities affordable to use. Responsive space systems must be simple enough and architected such that they are cost competitive for the function they perform. The overall approach must be incremental, however the initial capabilities must provide something short term that will show obvious utility to get the transformation started.
Economies of scale from these initial capabilities will lower costs and increase launch vehicle fleets and satellite launch rates such that we break out of the current paradigms. For this to be possible we must develop highly modular systems to maximize the spacecraft lot size. Large lots are most important at initial stages, when responsive space systems will be easiest to dismiss as too expensive. This is really only achievable by considering commercial needs for the system as well. Satellite buses and launch vehicles that are designed for military purposes need to be flexible enough that they can support commercial needs as well. The cost is an important requirement and depends of the market depth. The US government must work with its industry and possibly even international partners to help develop common interfaces and standards that can be applied for a wide spectrum of users to bring down cost, across the board. Responsive space must be architected such that it takes advantage of the commercial market and applies a commercial mindset if it is to be successful.
PURPOSE
There is a slowly materializing movement within the Department of Defense and a few other circles within the US government for responsive space. Although responsive space means something different to everyone, its principles are fairly well defined. The scope of this paper is to show and analyze the nascent and ever adapting responsive space architecture and highlight the importance of commercial requirements for military responsive space development. If the nation is to realize responsive space, the government must look to industry and the wider customer base to provide requirements to make the systems affordable. Current systems and ways of doing business are too expensive and limited to be used in the manner required for responsive space. Thus the nation needs to encourage and support the transformation of industry. Responsive space cannot succeed with large contractors whose only role is the integration of a few very expensive satellites. Space must benefit from industrial economies of scale. For this to happen the customer must be willing to accept more risk. It is easiest to break out of this paradigm at the smaller systems. For this reason most of the heuristics applied for creating a responsive space architecture will be focused on the small side. Further discussed are some of the specifics of what responsive space hopes to do, but for now responsive space can be thought of as bringing space capability to the user in a highly agile and flexible manner.
Why Architect Responsive Space? -The word "architecture" has become one of the more recent "buzz words du jour" in the broader defense community. A responsive space architecture describes what the elements of responsive space are and how they fit together. This sounds much easier than it is, since the system is based on requirements and an environment that which is years in the future.
Military planners are constantly thinking about how to fight in the future and develop systems what will allow them to fight better in the future. This will not be the focus of this paper but it should be in the back of any military planner's mind. Later on I will discuss some of the historical precedents leading to responsive space and how some of the attempts to make space more responsive in the past led to the current responsive space architecture.
The purpose of this paper is to lay out the current movement in responsive space and how the importance of understanding commercial and industry needs and capabilities are essential if responsive space is ever realized.
RESPONSIVE SPACE CAPABILITY
The Responsive Space Vision-Responsive space is a philosophy where space systems are more flexible and responsive to user's needs than traditional systems. This could come in one of three ways:
1. Rapidly launching and operating satellites 2. Rapidly maneuvering on-orbit predeployed assets 3. Rapidly reconfiguring on-orbit assets for new and tailored missions
The focus of this paper will be on the first method and requirements for developing systems (launch vehicles, spacecraft buses, payload and infrastructure) that are affordable enough to be employed.
The Dilemma-Current space systems are designed to be highly capable and highly reliable, able to operate often nominally for a decade in the cold, hard, vacuum of space. The government only launches a few satellites a year and they're quite expensive, so we spend a considerable effort to certify the spacecraft and launch vehicles. Over time, weight has grown due to the level of redundancy and the secondary and tertiary payloads that are added since it's easier to add another payload on an existing satellite than secure funding for a new one. These factors contribute to increasing costs and lengthened development timelines. We can no longer develop a new major space system in under a decade. Space systems have become highly effective but they have not gotten any cheaper. Over the course of the space age there hasn't been a significant drop in the price of space systems. This is a direct effect of the current way that we define, design, acquire and operate space systems. Increasing redundancy and lengthening timelines have made the industry more likely to lengthen design lives and add secondary payloads. All of this further increases complexity and cost while pushing the schedule out and overall decreasing the number of satellites and launch vehicles built.
The current statement of the problems has painted us into the proverbial corners that we cannot get out of. We've created some very effective systems, but they are often decades behind schedule and hundreds of millions of dollars over budget. Most importantly, they are not very responsive to warfighter needs. There is also a larger niche of missions that can't be done with current systems that are too slow to development and deploy. At some point in time we're going to have to walk out of this corner. This is the information age. Access to timely and accurate information has become the most important tool for shaping perception and deterring or fighting a war. Information often must come from space because of the global reach that only space systems can provide. The Internet has accelerated the rate of change in the world. Globalization and military systems envisioned to fight the 'Russian Bear' can't react quickly enough to the rapidly changing environment. By the time anything gets to orbit, it's horribly obsolete.
The UAV community is leading the charge to adapting to the new 21 st century information weapons with innovation such as the Hellfire missile on the Predator. These systems are often able to act quickly enough to reach the enemy, whereas a traditional cold-envisioned intelligence system cannot act quickly enough to have the desired effect.
Strategic Responsive Space-At the Strategic Level, responsive space systems provide the President and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) with many new options for addressing time-critical national security situations. To think about how perception works, consider the way the modern aircraft carrier has revolutionized American global power projection. The mere presence of a US carrier battle group changes the plans and perceptions of enemies and allies alike. By moving these floating cities around on the global chessboard, national decision makers can prevent conflict or prepare to strike. Space systems probably won't carry the weight of a few thousand resolute seamen off the coast, but responsive space systems might fill the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) mission areas nicely and provide a versatile deterrent. In denied areas, a Predator may not have the range required unless it is predeployed. Even then it can still be shot down. Another option like the B-2 bomber requires several days to reach a target on the other side of the world and increasingly carries the likelihood of being shot down in anti-access areas. However, a conventional weapon launched from a rocket might be able to get to that same target on the other side of the world in a couple of hours or less. The rocket wouldn't have to only deploy munitions. If intelligence is required, a small UAV could instead be deployed from the hypersonic glide vehicle launched from the small launch vehicle.
A small responsive launch vehicle could also launch small satellites. If two countries such as India and Pakistan were becoming hostile and neither country had the means to adequately survey their enemy, a third party such as the United States might be able to responsively deploy a small satellite to provide transparency to both parties. Adversely, if the President was considering actions somewhere in the world and wanted to avoid the escalation of direct surveillance, the freedom of space could allow a small satellite with the appropriate sensor to be launched to investigate a specific target set of interest. The President could use these satellites for escalation or de-escalation of conflict. Responsive space provides national decision makers new tools for influence and information.
Tactical Responsive Space-At the other side of responsive space is tactical support to theatre commanders of something called Joint Warfighting Space (JWS) by the Air Force Chief of Staff. General John P. Jumper decided it was time to: Let your imagination go. (Jumper, 2004) His vision of JWS tries to bring low cost space assets down to the hands of the commanders in the field. The current chain of command for processing and passing information from existing space systems funnels down through some of the highest levels within the government. This is because it was designed to function under an all out nuclear war. Hence, the information is not responsive to the tank battalion commander on the ground that quickly needs to know the location of the enemy column. Tactical satellites seek to reinvent much of this command structure for space systems to make them responsive for users on the ground. Tactical satellites could be dedicated for a certain theatre and tailored to meet that commander's possible shortfalls. Some of these tactical satellites will also fill in the gaps for smaller space constellations to provide the same type of capability for significantly less cost.
Making it happen-To make responsive space happen, paradigms would have to be broken and the current way of doing business would have to be remolded. The biggest reason for this is that responsive space systems must be significantly cheaper than other space systems operating and being acquired today. If this nation is going to commit itself to this type of approach, then prices are going to need to come down. To be cost effective, the prevailing thought is that these prices need to come down a factor of 10 or an order of magnitude. Obviously this is not going to happen for the same size and capability of satellites at are used today. However, increasingly capable payloads can be fit on smaller spacecraft. Technologies such as computing power and micro electronics have advanced significantly. Much more capable systems can get much smaller. Even so, cheap satellites will not be enough in themselves to make responsive space a reality. The entire approach to space must change. The only way for this to happen is to start small, develop the approach and build it up from there.
BACKGROUND
The inability to provide responsive space can certainly be attributed to today's risk adverse culture where the risk cycle may be described as "High Cost Risk Averseness High Cost," which once entered is almost impossible to break. One clear example of this mentality is in the current definition of "mission success." In present context, "success" may be defined as placing the spacecraft into orbit 99.9% of the time at the expense of schedule and cost. The new focus of "success" should be, "delivering a desired effect on time and within cost." Therefore a "success" may take three launches (with the first two being failures), since the effect was realized and the cost was low. Breaking out of this risk cycle is possible with a significant reduction in cost and allows space involvement in new mission areas.
It is important to remember that the situation we now are in is based on decisions made from lessons learned in the past. The events of our history led us to where we are now. Originally space development was pretty responsive because it had to be. There was a mandate from the highest levels of government to first develop an ICBM and then to land a man on the moon. However, it is highly unlikely that NASA will see budgets like they did during Apollo (approximately 4% of the national budget), nor will the Air Force see money flow like it did for General Schriever when he developed Atlas and Thor (then SAC had 40% of the DoD budget). Responsive Space was developed responsively and architected so that it could be responsive. After its ballistic attack role was replaced, Thor was deployed as a nuclear anti-satellite weapon in Program 437. Operationally this looks startlingly like the "new" responsive space concept. The existing Thor IRBM was taken off the shelf and flown down to Johnson Atoll to be used to shoot at any Russian missile trying to us sneak over the South Pole. This is not to different from General Jumper's current mantra for Joint Warfighting Space (JWS). They hadn't institutionalized a process that would have told them it couldn't work. They just went out and did it because the nation's survival depended on it. Later, though, as the Cold War dwindled and the missile contractors tried to put together rocket launch programs based on the heritage programs this mindset changed. The nation tightened its belt and this 'can do' mindset changed with the use of complicated processes to minimize the failure and control the risks. While controlling the risks, this further increased costs, and started the process that began to institutionalize much of the thinking that now stymies growth in the industry. In the late 80s and 90s it became obvious that they were significant problems with the national access to space. The shuttle had failed to bring any of the solutions that it had been expected to bring, and one shuttle had even been lost. Flights were costing on the order of half a billion dollars and flight rates were much lower than expected. An entire paper could be written on the architecting of the space shuttle.
This came from the decisions we made that led to an inflexibility of the design. One manifestation of this required that the main engines run at greater than 100%. This contributed enormously to the total systems responsiveness since the engines had to be serviced more frequently than normal. They also had to take out many other systems to access the engines, which also contributed significantly to cost.
As the Space Shuttle was struggling, the nation began looking for new options and over the next decade began several programs (DC-X, X-33, NASP, NAI, etc) on which to spend billions of dollars to try and develop the follow-on to the shuttle.
For this the designers turned to revolutionary approaches such as Single Stage to Orbit (SSTO) in the X-33 program.
X-33 failed because there were too many places where the technology wasn't sufficiently developed to be used-too many miracles required. EELV and Orbital Sciences Corp made another more recent attempt at decreasing the cost of space, but neither has been able to get the kinds of cost savings lack of demand. The bottom fell out of the presumed commercial market. This is one of the reasons that it is so important that the commercial business case be factored in if responsive space is ever going to happen.
If responsive
space is ever going to happen, small companies will have to provide the innovation. The largest contractors and their large bureaucracies can't build systems for the required costs. Small, privately funded innovators such as Beale Aerospace and, more recently, Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) have attempted to break the mold, but so far have been ineffective.
RESPONSIVE SPACE ARCHITECTURE
Responsive space is a highly dynamic process involving a wide variety of stakeholders across the DoD. There really isn't a centralized architecting process, but the architecture is beginning to emerge out of a multitude of studies and analyses. This certainly isn't the most efficient way to do architecting, but for a concept that doesn't really have much funding of its own, it's fairly understandable.
The first increment of responsive space was designed to be small enough that it would be able to realize some of the cost savings that were required yet large enough to be effective. This is a delicate balance between cost and performance.
Finding an optimal balance and understanding what the market can carry is very important and is generally not a way that the military is used to thinking. However, for a system that depends so much on price to be successful, it is very important to start small and build.
The history of space and the current ways of doing business are not going to make implementing this heuristic easy. Many processes that are currently designed to support large and expensive missions will have to be redesigned such as Command and Control (C2) and mission assurance. There are also many enabling systems that allow space systems to function whose costs and schedules must be controlled.
Other efforts and demonstrations are currently underway to address the technical and operational hurdles involved in delivering space-based capabilities quickly. Reporting directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Office of Force Transformation (OFT), led by ADM Arthur Cebrowski (Ret), has kicked off a Tactical Satellite (TacSat) initiative. The first experiment in the series, TacSat-1, is a Naval Research Laboratories (NRL) spacecraft to be launched early 2005, and will demonstrate the operational value of the tactical satellite. Follow-on tactical satellite demonstrations are in the works and remain essential for learning more about responsive space. For these kinds of missions, launching 1000 lbs to a reference Low Earth Orbit (LEO) has become the standard capability for the small side of responsive space. The joint Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)/AF Force Application and Launch from CONUS (FALCON) program intends to provide a responsive Small Launch Vehicle (SLV) or two, a nearterm Prompt Global Strike (PGS) capability, and the development test bed for a hypersonic vehicle. There are a number of useful missions that can be performed by a 1000-lb spacecraft. Some believe even smaller payloads will be useful, but 1000-lb is a reasonable place to start.
The Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) will be a hypersonic glider launched from an SLV. The glider will be able to deploy anything from wide area autonomous munitions to a space UAV nearly globally in minutes. The SLV will also launch small satellites that may be able to provide gap support for communications or blue force tracking, or provide timely Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR) through a variety of sensors. The notional architecture envisions a concept of operations for these systems based on the "wooden round" type concept where payloads can dynamically be swapped in and out of the vehicles and buses. Eventually there would be war reserve assets for contingency operations where launch vehicles would be prepped and stored in "the barn" ready to launch a series of standardized spacecraft with common interfaces to a set of payloads that would be tailored prior to launch for the specific mission. The same would be done for a CAV, where a number of payloads would be integrated into the CAV and then launched on a specific trajectory to meet the pre-set mission. Balancing cost and performance here would be tricky. The FALCON program is currently in phase two and is bringing four contractors to Critical Design Review (CDR). There are other efforts going on outside of FALCON that seek to increase the availability of affordable small spacecraft, but this one has significant funding hopes of minimizing cost design for the entire life cycle.
The point that proponents of this view are hitting on is that the DoD hasn't developed any satellites that can be launched quickly, nor does it have a plan to procure satellites in the timeline that the FALCON Program will be successful. It is understood that advances in technology, particularly in miniaturization, have led to the development of small satellites more capable than ever before, but there isn't an organized plan like the FALCON Program to develop these systems. This is a key and often cited problem with the responsive space movement as it stands now.
As mentioned before there isn't a clear structure of who is creating the responsive space architecture or where responsibility resides. Just this past year Air Force Space Command executed an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for Operationally Responsive Spacelift (ORS). As mentioned before, responsive space as it is now known has gone through many iterations and the idea of ORS was one of the more recent attempts. The AoA's purpose is to determine the best means to responsively launch, maneuver, service, and retrieve space payloads so as to enhance military effectiveness. The study tested a robust and varied array of lift architectures, as well as a stage with an expendable upper stage, the reverse of the Space Shuttle. By making the more stressed portion of the vehicle expendable and the payload capability more modest, the operational goals can be met in a cost-effective way for a significant majority of the national launch manifest. This vehicle would be large enough to place most military satellites into orbit except for the largest GEO communication satellites. Versions of some of the smaller satellites could be modified to fit, hypothetically creating satellites such as "GPS-lite" where some of the secondary payloads and some of the additional capabilities of GPS could be removed so that it could be used on this payload. The concept of employing more of these spacecraft would be different than the smaller missions because these satellites would seek to augment and replace the normal missions that were performed by traditional Air Force constellations. Responsiveness is essential to allow replenishment of losses should we lose satellites during conflict due to hostile effects. This type of capability is less defined from an operational side. Due to budgeting constraints, this capability will not come on line until the 2020 timeframe. The technical solution that came out of the AoA is quite interesting and is one of the few cases where a major study like this uncovered something that wasn't originally a presumed solution. The "hybrid" concept for this class of vehicles involved a reusable first stage which stages at about mach 7 and an expendable second stage. Both would be liquid fueled and analysis by the Aerospace Corporation shows cost savings of a factor of three may be realized with this type of system (Hickman 2004 ).
Often throughout engineering the biggest successes are systems that are incremental steps past the technology they are based on. This revolution has not occurred yet in the Aerospace industry. This is a subsequent goal of responsive space and is really the only way for responsive space to happen. Responsive space isn't a new idea. We've had it in the past and we still have it today with our nuclear ICBMs. However these systems are too expensive. If responsive space is to succeed, it must be cheap also. This will be the most difficult part.
No one seems to be able to make a strong decision and commit to responsive space in a strong way, nor is any one person or small group responsible for it. As such, responsive space means something different to everyone. This lack of leadership makes it difficult to determine who is creating the architecture and ensuring that there is minimal duplication of effort and analysis. One group has even attempted to attach all stratospheric balloons and high altitude airships as part of the responsive space tradespace. Whether this fails under responsive space or not is unclear because there isn't a specific organization tasked with creating an architecture.
HEURISTICS FOR A RESPONSIVE SPACE ARCHITECTURE
Although there have been many efforts to have launch on demand and affordable access to space, many of them failed because they had faulty assumptions and failed to understand the commercial market. Advocates of the current iteration of responsive space hope to change all of this by starting small and growing the commercial capability that is required to have affordable responsive access to space and responsive space capability. The most important thing to remember is the KISS principle (Keep it Simple Stupid) This is especially important for the first steps. If responsive space is to succeed it must start small, build a base, develop heuristics, and grow. This is the best way to open the door to space and change the way that we look to use space. Responsive space will have succeeded at the small side when spacecraft are being built in modular components by machines in an assembly line process like computer motherboards are today. That's the only way that prices will drop enough to transform how we approach space. The military will be able to launch small satellites on demand to support operations with tailored communication and intelligence missions; civil space will be able to swarm Mars with hundreds of small rovers to affordably uncover its mysteries; entrepreneurs will be able to provide revolutionary new utilities such as global broadband internet access that will make Teledesic look like a feeble and short sided attempt; university students will be able to build and fly payloads pushing technology further and creating a burgeoning new aerospace workforce. All four of these factions must be considered if responsive space is ever going to succeed. On both the launch vehicle side as well as the satellite side we have the technologies appropriately developed. The "know-what" is taken care of; now it is just a matter of succeeding in the "know-how" and putting together and executing a good architecture.
To be more completive as an industry, Aerospace must execute their know-how. Only then will it really grow and begin bringing the promises that it once toted. Here are a few basic principles (heuristics) required for starting this revolution with the small side of responsive space that could enable so much more.
Recipe for Small Responsive Space
1. Start small but remember vision 2. Engage broad community of users 3. Buy significant lots at fixed prices 4. Common modular approach and standardized interfaces, not optimization
Acceptance of Risk
Start small but remember vision-For responsive space it is clear that small launch vehicles and small satellites will cost less than larger ones. Technology has advanced to the point that significant effects can be delivered from small systems. These costs will come down as the proper knowhow is applied against small systems that will help the economies of scale to start kicking in sooner. The architect needs to remember the long term vision for where the larger responsive space movement will go and the larger scale missions that will eventually be possible. He must keep a delicate balance between optimization of the small side of things with flexibility of scaling the production and infrastructure. The bias, however, should always go to the small side because without its effective employment, growth will not happen.
Engage broad community of users-The government, in leading a push towards responsive space, must seek out users to better understand the requirements to decrease costs by mass-producing and standardizing components to increase bus and launch vehicle lot size. Many possible users that would love to do things in space, but don't have the money required and the long schedules frustrating them. The government must do what it can to lower the costs of entry to gain access to pent up demand. To do this government and industry who need to decide on a few standard spacecraft buses that cost $3-4M for a select set of small spacecraft missions. Then secured a consistent build on a set of the launch vehicles then might run the price down to $5M. Both of these would need to be industry standard highly reliable systems not labor intensive space system. Finally if the range prices dropped to a few hundred thousand dollars, then the cost for a total small satellite mission would drop to on the order of $10M, a rate even many universities could afford. In addition to the obvious military and commercial aspects, other customers might pop up. Exactly how elastic the supply and demand curve is at this point isn't exactly understood but it is clear that a price drop would shatter the status quo and vastly increase the use of Low Earth Orbit.
Buy significant lots at fixed prices-Once a community of users has been established it must take the Costco approach and buy in bulk. Much has been said recently about the values of different contracting types and the strength and weaknesses of the different approaches. However, for the broad and flexible requirements of small responsive space, firm fixed pricing is really the only one that supports the other goals of the initiative. Cost reimbursable type contracting requires accounting systems and oversight that will only serve to increase costs. The government must be proactive in reaching out to the other users of small spacecraft so everyone can benefit from larger lots and the learning curves and economies of scale that it could bring.
Also, the government must look beyond a year or two, as is often the case with small generally experimental type payloads, and buy for several years and then plan for the future to those interfaces. Purchase buses to fit in a reserved launch vehicle and payloads that fit the requirements of the bus. None of these will be optimized, but cost will be significantly decreased and the responsiveness much greater.
Common modular approach and standardized interfaces, not optimization-The only way to make these large buys of satellites buses and launch vehicles effective is to employ modular and standardized components as much as possible. This means avoiding optimization and developing a low cost highly reliable components that are "plug and play." Industrial grade parts must be the standard. It is difficult to optimize one spacecraft, and millions of dollars are spent doing that, by going to modular standards like those you find in your home computer. Engineers can focus on figuring out what you can do with the mission rather than creating new interfaces for everything.
Acceptance of Risk-Overall, we must accept more risk on these small systems. We cannot afford to analyze these systems the same way that we do for mission assurance on a half a billion dollar mission. We must accept that failure is an option. Current ways of doing missions with only space certified hardware and piece parts program will not work for responsive space. We cannot afford piece parts programs on small space systems. Buses will have much shorter design lives and be single string, but the so-called bathtub curve still says those systems that were put together correctly to survive the first few weeks will probably last more than long enough for the mission. Should the satellite or launch vehicle fail initially it should be cheap to launch another if needed, and the insurance on this type of mission is much more manageable if required. The one part of redundancy that can't be avoided would be safety. Flight Termination Systems (FTS) must remain highly redundant; however, the standards that are applied to them currently don't fit the necessary approach. A common set of FTS will be required to provide for a family of launch vehicles but piece parts programs that allow a single system to have a redundancy of 0.999 need to be a thing of the past. Responsive space will examine getting this same redundancy with numerous lower reliability parts. For example two components in parallel, each with a reliability of 0.99, together have a reliability better than 0.999 and 3 components with an abysmal 0.9 have a total reliability of 0.999. Each of those "9's" in components reliability is often bought at a price of an order of magnitude or more. There are many other ways to get the reliability when you need it. When the lots sizing are large enough and machines are stamping out spacecraft buses, payloads, and launch vehicles in bulk, the reliability will likely rise significantly over the current double and triple checked assemblage by humans. When the builds rise significantly, so will the reliability. Initially, though, we can't be afraid to fail to get to these goals. We can't change course and go back to the old way of doing business just because there are a few failures, which there are guaranteed to be. We must stay the course and accept the risk.
WAY AHEAD FOR RESPONSIVE SPACE AND CONCLUSIONS
Satisfying all elements of responsive space is the best near term method to break the downward spiral of increasing cost, worsening technological obsolescence, lengthening development and deployment timelines, substantive loss in the innovative aerospace workforce, and utter avoidance of risk, all of which are currently hindering the American aerospace industry.
Relaxed performance requirements allow the shift from need for large, expensive, one-of-a-kind, Cold-War era spacecraft toward inexpensive, mass-produced, and highly robust systems. Greater numbers of less expensive spacecraft increases competition, reinvigorates the industrial base, allows the timely insertion of advanced technologies, and resets the design paradigm. Furthermore, as the cost of lift is decreased, it becomes more affordable to experiment with and test different designs and approaches rather than spending years and millions of dollars for paper studies.
Another significant step can be achieved by reducing the requirements for individual systems.
Analogous to residential utilities, the establishment of a space infrastructure to provide power, communication, fuel, and other commodities can significantly reduce the number of sub-systems, complexity, mass, and cost of individual spacecraft. A comprehensive discussion regarding rapid development is beyond the scope of this paper, but there are no technical "show-stoppers" or reasons why we cannot design and build space systems in 6 to 18 months. Thorough work has been accomplished exploring the trade space for responsive space and there are a number of military relevant capabilities that can be performed in that 1000-lb case previously described. If this is possible there are surely even more civil, business, and academic applications that are possible. The military requirements will not be enough on their own to start the responsive space transformation, only by embracing the other customer for small spacecraft and understand the economic and programmatic constraints that industry is under can it succeed.
